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The parties to this litigation are: 
Appellant: Sandy City, a municipal corporation. 
Respondents: 
(a) Salt Lake County, a political subdivision of 
the State of Utah; 
(b) Salt Lake County Planning Commission, an 
administrative agency of Salt Lake County; 
(c) McDonald's Corporation; and 
(d) John Does 1-5. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Section 78-2-2(3) (j) of the Utah Code and Rule 4(a) of the Rules 
of the Utah Supreme Court. This is an appeal from the Order of 
the Third District Court for Salt Lake County, the Honorable J. 
Dennis Frederick, which granted (a) McDonald's Motion to Dismiss 
Sandy City's Verified Complaint, (b) McDonald's and Salt Lake 
County's respective Motions for Summary Judgment against Sandy 
City, and (c) McDonald's Motion to Strike Affidavit, and which 
denied Sandy City's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for determination in 
this appeal: 
1. Whether the lower court erred in granting 
McDonald's motion to dismiss, ruling as a matter of law that the 
legal doctrine of laches barred Sandy City's Verified Complaint, 
where McDonald's made no showing of damage, injury or prejudice 
resulting from Sandy City's alleged untimely filing of its 
Verified Complaint, and where Sandy City's filing was, in fact, 
timely. 
2. Whether the lower court erred as a matter of law in 
its construction and interpretation of applicable state statutes, 
thus allowing Salt Lake County to act in excess of its statutory 
authority. 
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3. Whether the lower court erred as a matter of law in 
interpreting and applying state statutes contrary to express 
constitutional and legislative objectivesf purposes and intent, 
and contrary to sound public policy. 
4. Whether the lower court erred as a matter of law in 
its interpretation and application of Salt Lake County ordinances, 
thus allowing Salt Lake County to act in excess of its authority. 
5. Whether the lower court erred as a matter of law in 
striking an affidavit, with attached appraisal, submitted by Sandy 
City in support of its cross-motion for summary judgment. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
1. Utah Code Ann. Section 10-2-401 (setting forth the 
legislative policy of the State of Utah relative to urban 
development). For full text see Addendum "B," attached hereto. 
2. Utah Code Ann. Section 10-1-104(11): 
"Urban development" means a housing subdivision 
involving more than 15 residential units with an 
average of less than one acre per residential unit 
or a commercial or industrial development for which 
cost projections exceed $750,000 for any or all 
phases. 
3. Utah Code Ann. Section 10-2-418: 
Urban development shall not be approved or 
permitted within one-half mile of a municipality in 
the unincorporated territory which the municipality 
has proposed for municipal expansion in its policy 
declaration, if a municipality is willing to annex 
the territory proposed for such development under 
the standards and requirements set forth in this 
chapter. . . . 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Defendant McDonald's predecessors in interest, 
Priest, Yeates, Kjar and Smoot (hereinafter "P.Y.K.S.") purchased 
approximately 4.18 acres of commercial property (hereinafter 
"property") from Mickelson Enterprises in 1987 for approximately 
$890,000, said Property being located on the northwest corner of 
10600 South and 1300 East in unincorporated Salt Lake County. On 
or about April 9, 1987, P.Y.K.S., acting as agent for Mickelson 
Enterprises, made application to Salt Lake County Development 
Services Division for a change in zoning for the property from 
Rural Residential to Commercial. See copy of Application, at p. 
322, Record on Appeal (R.O.A.); Affidavit of K. Delyn Yeates, p. 
209, R.O.A.; and McDonald's Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
in Support of it's Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for 
Summary Judgment (hereinafter "McDonald's Memorandum"), at p. 132, 
R.O.A. 
2. The change in zoning request referred to in 
paragraph 1, next above, on its face indicated the developers' 
intent that the property be a "commercial subdivision" with 
"homogeneity of theme and development," and listed multiple 
potential commercial "tenants," including defendant McDonald's, 
who had expressed "interest" in the development. See copy of 
Application, supra. 
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4. P.Y.K.S. sold approximately .7 acres of the 
property to Chevron U.S.A., Inc., for construction of a gas 
station-convenience store. Salt Lake County granted a conditional 
use permit for that construction over Sandy City's protest. After 
Sandy City's appeal of that grant to the Salt Lake County 
Commission was denied by the Commission, Sandy City filed suit in 
Third District Court. Summary Judgment was granted by Judge Uno 
against Sandy City, and the matter (hereinafter referred to as the 
"Chevron Action") is now on appeal before the Utah Court of 
Appeals. See McDonald's Memorandum, supra, at pp. 133-36, R.O.A. 
5. P.Y.K.S. then entered into an agreement to sell 
approximately 1.3 acres of the property to McDonald's. Ld. at p. 
137, R.O.A. McDonald's 1.3 acres were adjacent to and immediately 
to the north of Chevron's .7 acres. See id. at p. 138, R.O.A. 
6. McDonald's, acting as the property owner's 
authorized agent, then petitioned Salt Lake County for a 
conditional use permit. Id. 
7. The Salt Lake County Planning Commission approved 
Chevron's conditional use permit on October 13, 1987. One week 
later, on October 21, 1987, the Salt Lake County Commission upheld 
the decision of the Planning Commission's approval. Then, on 
October 27, 1987, the Planning Commission approved McDonald's 
application for conditional use. On December 9, 1987, the Salt 
Lake County Commission upheld the decision of the Planning 
4 
Commission approving McDonald's application, denying Sandy City's 
appeal, and then issued its findings and formally granted 
conditional use to McDonald's on or about January 13, 1988. Id. 
at pp. 137-39, R.O.A. McDonald's did not purchase the property 
until March 24, 1988. Id. at pp. 134-41, and 152, R.O.A. 
8. Sandy City did not learn of McDonald's purchase of 
the parcel until April of 1988, and on May 10, Sandy City 
requested the Salt Lake County Attorney to enjoin the McDonald's 
development. On May 27, Sandy City received notice from the 
County Attorney that no action would be taken. On June 13, 1988, 
Sandy City filed its Verified Complaint. See Sandy City's 
Verified Complaint, at pp. 5-6, 15 and 27-29, R.O.A. 
9. The property was located within areas included in 
Salt Lake County's Little Cottonwood District Development Plan, 
which was part of Salt Lake County's Master Plan. The Development 
Plan was a ten (10) year plan approved in 1976, and expired by its 
terms in 1985. No new master plan had been adopted by Salt Lake 
County at any time pertinent here. See District Development Plan, 
at p. 222, R.O.A.; Salt Lake County's Memorandum in Support of 
it's Motion for Summary Judgment, at p. 233-34, R.O.A. 
10. The property abuts the municipal boundaries of 
Sandy City, and is located within an unincorporated "island" 
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within Sandy City limits. See Sandy City's Verified Complaint, 
supra, at p. 4, R.O.A. 
11. Sandy City has adopted an Annexation Policy 
Declaration under authority of and consistent with state statute. 
A copy of said Declaration is attached to Sandy City's Verified 
Complaint, and the map portion thereof shows that the property 
here in question falls within said Declaration. JEcl. at pp. 4 and 
23-25, R.O.A. 
12. McDonald's agreed to purchase its 1.3 acre parcel 
of the property for $300,000. See Affidavit of Roy Drake, and 
exhibits attached thereto, at pp. 305-320, R.O.A. 
13. An MAI appraisal estimated the total costs needed 
to improve McDonald's 1.3 acre parcel, excluding land value, to 
fall within the range of $650,000 to $825,000. See Affidavit of 
Gary Free at pp. 328-29, R.O.A., and his Appraisal Report, at pp. 
323.1-323.5, R.O.A. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lower court's dismissal of Sandy City's Verified 
Complaint on the basis of laches was erroneous and contrary to law 
because (a) Sandy City's Verified Complaint seeking extraordinary 
relief from a decision by the Salt Lake County Commission was 
Sandy City's only available remedy, there being no statutory 
appeal procedure, and the filing thereof by Sandy City was timely 
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filed after Sandy City had exhausted its administrative remedies, 
and (b) McDonald's made no showing of damage, injury or prejudice 
resulting from the alleged delay by Sandy City in filing its 
Verified Complaint, as is required before laches may be applied as 
an affirmative defense to bar a complaint. 
The lower court erred as a matter of law in its 
construction and application of statutory provisions governing 
urban development in unincorporated territory within one-half mile 
of a municipality's jurisdictional limits, and in doing so it 
abrogated Utah law governing statutory construction. The lower 
court's ruling disregarded express and unambiguous legislative 
objectives and intent, and strictly construed statutory language 
which, by law, should have been liberally construed. As a result, 
the lower court wrongfully allowed Salt Lake County to act in 
excess of its authority in approving a conditional use permit for 
McDonald's. Because Salt Lake County acted ultra vires, however, 
the permit granted to McDonald's is void, and the McDonald's 
development is unlawful because it has received no approval from 
Sandy City. 
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, does not apply 
here because this action and the Chevron Action (the prior case 
upon which respondents' here have based their estoppel argument), 
have different facts and different procedural postures, and 
according to Utah law such differences prevent application of 
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issue preclusion to bar Sandy City's Verified Complaint. Thus, 
its ruling that collateral estoppel barred Sandy City's Verified 
Complaint was contrary to Utah law and should be reversed. 
Finally, the lower court's ruling which struck the 
Affidavit and MAI Appraisal of Gary Free should be reversed 
because the lower court considered the content and substance of 
the affidavit and appraisal, thus making moot its ruling to 
strike. In addition, the affidavit and appraisal established 
prima facie foundation for the expert opinion expressed therein, 
which, if given at trial, would be admissible. Accordingly, the 
expert appraisal is admissible, and the order to strike the same 
was contrary to law and should be reversed. 
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should reverse the 
lower court's Order and remand this action with an order to the 
Court below to enter summary judgment in favor of Sandy City, or, 
in the alternative, remand for trial. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT'S DISMISSAL OF SANDY 
CITY'S COMPLAINT ON THE BASIS OF LACHES 
SHOULD BE REVERSED 
A. Standard of Review 
The lower court ruled, as a matter of law, that Sandy 
City's Verified Complaint should be dismissed on the basis of 
laches. See Order Granting Motions to Dismiss and for Summary 
Judgment of Salt Lake County and McDonald's Corporation and 
McDonald Corporation's Motion to Strike, and Denying Sandy City's 
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Order"), at p. 
571-577, R.O.A., copy attached hereto as Addendum "A." On review 
of the lower court's Order, this Court must apply the "analytical 
standard required of the trial court." See Lucky Seven Rodeo 
Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988). This is 
the standard of review for summary judgments and must be applied 
here because the "order recited it was based on the pleadings, the 
affidavits on file, and arguments of counsel [and] [t]herefore, 
the order granting the motion to dismiss was, in fact, a summary 
judgment." Strand v. Associated Students of University of Utah, 
561 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1977); see also Order, supra, at p. 575, 
R.O.A. In applying this standard of review, this Court is free to 
reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions reached in granting 
the motion. Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. , 755 P. 2d at 752; see also 
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Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 1985) 
(appellate court gives no deference to lower court's conclusions 
of law which are reviewed for correctness). 
Laches is an equitable defense which requires the party 
asserting it to establish two separate elements before the defense 
may be applied by the court. First, there must be a showing of 
undue delay as a result of a clear lack of diligence, and 
secondly, there must be shown some identifiable damage, injury, or 
prejudice resulting directly from that unwarranted delay. See 
Leavor v. Grose, 610 P.2d 1262, 1263 (Utah 1980). Thus, for this 
Court to affirm the lower court's granting of McDonald's Motion to 
Dismiss on the basis of laches, it must conclude as a matter of 
law that (a) the Verified Complaint filed by Sandy City was 
untimely, (b) the untimeliness was a result of a clear lack of 
diligence on the part of Sandy City, and (c) McDonald's was 
damaged, injured, or prejudiced as a direct result of that 
unwarranted delay by Sandy City. 
B. Damage or Prejudice to McDonald's 
Even assuming, arguendo, that Sandy City's action was 
untimely, McDonald's has failed to establish the second required 
element of the doctrine of laches; that is, that it was damaged, 
injured or prejudiced as a result of an unwarranted delay. Below, 
McDonald's filed 62 pages of argument in memoranda form, four 
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separate affidavits with attachments totaling 31 pages, and 119 
pages of attachments to its memoranda. Yet, in these 212 pages, 
McDonald's did not argue once, nor did it provide one shred of 
evidence, that it had been damaged, injured, or prejudiced as a 
direct result of Sandy City's alleged undue delay in filing this 
action. McDonald's made no allegation of damage in its Answer, 
and, in fact, made no mention below of the doctrine of laches 
except for the Fourth Defense in its Answer, wherein McDonald's 
stated simply: "This action is barred by the doctrine of laches, 
waiver, and estoppel." See McDonald's Answer, at p. 70, R.O.A. 
It is the well-established law in Utah that matters not 
raised by parties in the trial court below cannot be considered 
for the first time on appeal. See Lane v. Messer, 731 P. 2d 488, 
491 (Utah 1986); see also Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 944 
(Utah 1987). The first time McDonald's argued that it had been 
damaged by Sandy City's alleged untimely filing of its Verified 
Complaint was in a motion for summary disposition filed with the 
Supreme Court after Sandy City had filed its Docketing Statement 
in this appeal. See McDonald's Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of its Motion to Affirm the District Court 
Order Dismissing this Case with Prejudice, at pp. 10-11, thereof. 
Thus, it is clear from the record that McDonald's has 
not shown, established, proven or even alleged that it was damaged 
as a direct result of an untimely filing of Sandy City's Verified 
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Complaint. Accordinglyf the lower court's ruling, made as a 
matter of law, that laches barred Sandy City's Verified Complaint, 
was clearly erroneous and must be reversed by this Court. 
C. Sandy City's Verified Complaint Was Filed Timely 
Although the lower court made no findings regarding the 
timeliness of the filing of Sandy City's Verified Complaint, 
McDonald's argued below that Sandy City was required by Section 
78-2a-3(2) (a) of the Utah Code to file an appeal with the Utah 
Court of Appeals within thirty (30) days of the Salt Lake County 
Commission's decision to affirm the Planning Commission's approval 
of McDonald's conditional use permit. McDonald's argument with 
regard to untimeliness was based upon the assumption that the Salt 
Lake County Commission's decision was a final order or decree of a 
"state [or] local agency" requiring a formal appeal. See Utah 
Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1987). Section 78-2a-3(4), 
however, states that the Court of Appeals "shall comply with the 
requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its review of agency 
adjudicative proceedings." JEd. at Section 78-2a-3(4) (1987). The 
Code reference is to the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. 
Contrary to McDonald's position, however, the Act applies only to 
state and not to local agencies. See Davis County v. Clearfield 
City, 756 P.2d 704, 706 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988). In fact, the Act 
specifically excludes any application to any political subdivision 
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of the state, or any administrative unit of a political 
subdivision of the state. Id.; see also Utah Code Ann. Section 
63-46b-2(l)(b) (1987). 
Thus, a decision from a political subdivision of the 
state or from one of its administrative units, which, in this 
case, would be the Salt Lake County Commission, does not fall 
within the provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
and is not included within the jurisdictional parameters of the 
Utah Court of Appeals. See Utah Code Ann. Section 63-46b-2(l) (a) 
(1987) (defines a state or local "agency" to exclude political 
subdivisions of the state). There being no statutory appeal 
procedure for Sandy City to follow with regard to the Salt Lake 
County Commission's decision, "other than to obtain review by the 
traditional means of seeking an extraordinary writ," see Davis 
County, 756 P. 2d at 707, the Verified Complaint filed by Sandy 
City seeking an extraordinary writ from the District Court was the 
appropriate avenue of remedy for Sandy City. Accordingly, no 
statutory thirty-day appeal limit, as argued below by McDonald's, 
was applicable. 
Furthermore, Rule 56B of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, governing extraordinary writs, does not establish a 
time limit for filing the same. Nevertheless, Sandy City's filing 
was made in a timely fashion. Following the County Commission's 
decision denying Sandy City's appeal from the Planning Commission 
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and soon after it learned that McDonald's had become the owner of 
record of the real property here in question, Sandy City sought 
relief from the Salt Lake County Attorney pursuant to Section 17-
27-23 of the Utah Code, which grants to the County Attorney 
authority to "institute injunction, mandamus . . . or any other 
appropriate action or proceedings to prevent, enjoin . . . or 
remove the unlawful . . . use or act" violating a county zoning 
law. See Utah Code Ann. Section 17-27-23 (1953, as amended). On 
May 27, 1988, Sandy City received a response from the Salt Lake 
County Attorney refusing to enjoin McDonald's development. See 
Sandy City's Verified Complaint, supra. Sandy City then filed its 
Verified Complaint on or about June 13, 1988, within thirty days 
after it had exhausted all available administrative remedies. Id. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONSTRUED SECTIONS 
10-1-104(11) AND 10-2-418 OF THE UTAH CODE AND 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST SANDY CITY BASED 
THEREON SHOULD BE REVERSED AND SANDY CITY'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE GRANTED 
A. Utah Law of Statutory Construction 
The courts of this state are required to liberally 
construe statutes with a view to effect the statute's purpose, 
object, and legislative intent. See Utah Code Ann. Section 68-3-2 
(1953, as amended). The law also requires Utah courts to consider 
each term and phrase of a statute, because the same "was used 
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advisably by the Legislature and . . . each term should be 
interpreted and applied according to its usually accepted 
meaning." West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982). 
See also Gord v. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah 2d 138, 434 P.2d 449, 451 
(1967) (courts must presume that "words and phrases were chosen 
advisably to express legislative intent" and the courts should 
apply them "in accordance with [their] literal wording"). 
In Section 10-2-401 of the Code, it is stated clearly 
and unequivocally that it is the state's legislative policy and 
intent to grant authority and responsibility to the state's 
municipalities for "urban governmental services essential for 
sound urban development and for the protection of public health, 
safety, and welfare in residential, commercial, and industrial 
areas." Utah Code Ann. Section 10-2-401(2). Where that urban 
development takes place in unincorporated territory within one-
half mile of a municipality, Section 10-2-418 of the Code and the 
express policy statements of the statute cited above clearly 
indicate that the State of Utah intended to grant municipalities 
an overriding interest in that development far greater in scope 
and application than the interest granted the county government in 
which the proposed development is located. 
Accordingly, in this dispute between Sandy City and Salt 
Lake County over the development of property located within one-
half mile of Sandy City's jurisdictional boundaries and the 
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resolution of the dispute centers on the interpretation of Section 
10-2-418 of the Utah Code, it is clear that the lower court should 
have liberally construed that statute with a view to effectuate 
the state's policy of granting to Sandy City, rather than to Salt 
Lake County, the primary responsibility for and paramount interest 
in that development. The lower court, however, failed to apply 
this Utah law of statutory construction and, contrary to law, 
strictly construed the statute against Sandy City in favor of Salt 
Lake County, erroneously basing its summary judgment ruling on 
that strict interpretation. 
B. Liberally Construing the Statutes 
1. "Urban Development" 
Specific language from two statutory provisions is at 
issue here. The first provision is found at Section 10-2-418 and 
reads, in pertinent part, as follows: 
Urban development shall not be improved or 
permitted within one-half mile of a municipality in the 
unincorporated territory which the municipality has 
proposed for a municipal expansion in its policy 
declaration, if a municipality is willing to annex the 
territory proposed for such development under the 
standards and requirements set forth in this chapter. 
Utah Code Ann. Section 10-2-418. The second statutory provision 
at issue is the definition provided by statute for "urban 
development," and is found at Section 10-1-104(11): 
16 
"Urban development" means a housing subdivision 
involving more than fifteen residential units with an 
average of less than one-acre per residential unit or a 
commercial or industrial development for which cost 
projections exceed $750,000 for any or all phases. 
Id. at Section 10-1-104(11). 
The following facts pertinent to application of the 
statutory provisions are undisputed and were presented to the 
lower court: 
(a) The McDonald's development is a "commercial 
development"; 
(b) At the time Salt Lake County approved McDonald's 
conditional use permit, McDonald's was not the owner of the 
subject property and had not yet paid the $300,000 it had promised 
for the real property; 
(c) The "cost projections" presented by McDonald's to 
the Salt Lake County Commission and adopted by the Commission 
included only the costs of the "shell" of the restaurant building 
and excluded McDonald's cost projections of $300,000 for the real 
property and the costs associated with making the generic building 
"shell" into a McDonald's fast-food restaurant by adding permanent 
fixtures without which there could be no restaurant, including, 
but not limited to, booths, benches, grills, counter tops, french 
fry fryers, milk shake dispensers, cash registers, "Golden 
Arches," etc.; 
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(d) A professional MAI appraisal of the McDonald's 
development shows that the projected costs, including costs for 
real property and permanent fixtures, exceeded $950,000, and this 
appraisal and the contents of this appraisal were considered by 
the lower court below; 
(e) No other cost projects for real property and 
permanent fixtures were presented to the Salt Lake County 
Commission or to the Court below; 
(f) The real property at issue is within one-half mile 
of Sandy City's municipal boundaries, lying in unincorporated Salt 
Lake County; 
(g) Sandy City had issued a Policy Declaration, as 
required by statute, wherein Sandy City had expressed its 
willingness to annex the property at issue here under the 
standards and requirements set forth by statute• 
Even though the statutory definition of "urban 
development" expressly includes cost projections of a commercial 
development "for any or all phases" of that development, the court 
below ruled that McDonald's cost projections for the development 
phase of real property acquisition and for the development phase 
of adding permanent fixtures, without which there could be no 
McDonald's restaurant, should not be included as a matter of law 
in the calculations to determine whether or not the cost 
projections "for any or all phases" of the development exceeded 
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$750,000. See Order, supra, at paragraph 2, p. 573, R.O.A. In 
other words, the lower court ruled that the statutory phrase, "for 
any or all phases," did not really mean what it said, but rather 
meant "some or part of" the phases of the development. 
The term "phase" is defined in the dictionary as "a 
stage or interval in a development; . . . an aspect or part (as of 
a situation or activity) being subjected to consideration," 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, (Unabridged) at 1694 
(1966), and as "any stage or form in a series of changes as in 
development," Webster's New World Dictionary, Second Concise 
Edition at 560 (1978). The lower court either completely ignored 
the standard, common, and ordinary mean of the term "phase," and 
the statutory definition requiring consideration of cost 
projections "for any or all phases," or, in the alternative, it 
strictly interpreted the statutory definition to favor Salt Lake 
County. In either event, the lower court abrogated well-
established and precedential Utah law of statutory construction. 
See West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d at 446; Gord v. Salt Lake 
City, 434 P.2d at 451; Utah Code Ann. Section 68-3-2. 
It is clear that the statutory phrase, "for any and all 
phases," was used advisably by the Legislature. It is critical 
that all phases of a commercial development, including the costs 
of land acquisition and the costs of adding permanent fixtures 
which are absolutely essential for that development, be taken into 
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consideration by governmental entities in projecting the 
governmental needs associated with a development in an urban area. 
Doing such is required, sound public policy. For example, a 1.3 
acre parcel of land, the same amount of land which was to be 
purchased by McDonald's here, covered with sagebrush west of 
Delta, Utah, probably will not sell for $300,000 (unless gold, 
oil, or natural gas in considerable quantity lie beneath it); but 
1.3 acres targeted for a popular fast-food franchise at a major 
intersection in a fast-developing area of Salt Lake Valley, with 
commercial properties all around it, may indeed sell for $300,000. 
The cost of land escalates as the potential for profit from its 
use escalates. A fast-food restaurant requires customers: more 
customers mean more profit. The property located where potential 
customers are plentiful (and profit potential is high) is more 
valuable than property located where potential customers are 
scarce (and profit potential is low). 
Thus, the high cost of commercial real property in an 
urban area, in and of itself, more likely than not indicates a 
future increase in motor vehicle traffic in the area, an increase 
in the demand for municipal services including law enforcement, 
traffic engineering improvements, upgrading roads, and indicates 
future additional commercial development in the area, etc. Thus, 
omitting the cost projections for acquisition of real property in 
a commercial development would inhibit proper and effective 
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governmental planning necessary to meet the needs created by that 
development in the urban area. The same is true for cost 
projections for permanent fixtures. 
Where projected costs for permanent fixtures in a fast-
food restaurant are quite high, it is more likely than not that 
the fast-food restaurant plans on high-traffic volume to generate 
sufficient profits to cover the high costs. The increased traffic 
entering and exiting that property would create unique and 
substantial governmental problems sufficient to warrant 
legislative directives regarding urban development, and would be 
sufficient to warrant inclusion of the cost projections for those 
permanent fixtures into the total cost of a development in order 
to assist the affected governmental entity in determining whether 
the development is in fact an "urban development." Absent those 
cost projections, a true and accurate impression of the commercial 
development would be impossible and the governmental entities 
responsible for providing governmental services to that urban 
development would be significantly hindered in planning for and 
providing necessary services to that area. 
The wisdom of the Legislature thus becomes self-
evident. Cost projections for this kind of development must 
include costs for "all phases" of the development or proper 
governmental planning and performance is seriously undermined. 
And because the Legislature expressly identified municipalities as 
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the preferred governmental entity responsible for and best-suited 
to meet the public needs associated with commercial development in 
urban areas, the lower court's ruling shows a glaring failure to 
liberally construe Sections 10-2-418 and 10-1-104(11) in favor of 
Sandy City, as was required by law. 
Here, undisputed evidence put cost projections for land 
acquisition by McDonald's at $300,000. Undisputed expert 
appraisal testimony put the development's construction costs, 
including absolutely essential permanent fixtures, at $650,000 to 
$850,000. Thus, the total cost projections for the commercial 
development in all of its phases easily surpassed the statutory 
threshold of $750,000. The lower court's refusal to apply Section 
10-2-418 was thus clearly erroneous and should be reversed. 
2. "Willing to Annex" 
The lower court also held that "Sandy City had not 
expressed a willingness to annex the property that is the subject 
of this lawsuit at the time that the McDonald's permit application 
was approved." See Order, supra, at paragraph 3. This portion of 
the ruling refers to Section 10-2-418, which conditions the denial 
of approval or permit for an urban development on the following 
condition: ". . . if a municipality is willing to annex the 
territory proposed for such development under the standards and 
requirements set forth in this chapter." Utah Code Ann. Section 
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10-2-418. The lower court did not set forth the factual basis for 
its conclusion, so it must be assumed that it adopted the 
arguments presented by McDonald's and Salt Lake County below. 
There, the respondents argued that Sandy City must 
affirmatively declare a specific willingness to annex particular 
parcels of property or Section 10-2-418 does not apply to that 
specific property. See McDonald's Memorandum, supra, at pp. 137-
38, R.O.A. No such requirement appears in the statute. Adoption 
of that argument by the lower court, again, constitutes a strict 
interpretation of the statute and an application contrary to the 
legislative objective clearly stated elsewhere in the chapter. 
All the statutory provision requires is that Sandy City be 
"willing to annex the territory proposed for [urban] development 
under the standards and requirements set forth in this chapter." 
Utah Code Ann. Section 10-2-418 (emphasis added). 
The phrase "under the standards and requirements set 
forth in this chapter" modifies the phrase "willing to annex" and 
no other modification of the phrase "willing to annex" appears in 
the provision. Thus, it is clear that the Legislature did not 
here impose upon Sandy City an affirmative duty to express 
formally by specific city ordinance or otherwise a willingness to 
annex this particular, specific parcel of real property, but 
rather, the Legislature simply required that Sandy City be willing 
to annex this property according to the standards and requirements 
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set forth in the State's annexation statutes. It is undisputed 
that Sandy City's Policy Declaration, which included in its 
general property description the parcels of real property here at 
issue, conforms with the standards and requirements set forth in 
the annexation statutes of the Utah Code. No other requirement is 
imposed upon municipalities by the statute. Requiring 
municipalities to do something other than as indicated in the 
statute is an erroneous interpretation of Section 10-2-418 and 
favors the unincorporated county government rather than the 
municipality, contrary to the legislative objective of the 
statute. 
It is clear that if a municipality's annexation policy 
and procedures are not consistent with the standards and 
requirements of the state code, then regardless of that city's 
willingness to annex particular parcels of real property, whether 
expressed by passage of a formal ordinance or otherwise, Section 
10-2-418 simply would not apply. Where, however, a city's 
annexation policies and procedures are consistent with the state 
code standards and requirements, and the property in question is 
included in a formal policy declaration by the city showing a 
willingness to annex that property, then the requirements of 
Section 10-2-418 are satisfied and the provision applies. Such 
was the case here. Compare Sandy City Annexation Policy 
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Declaration, a copy attached to Sandy City's Verified Complaint, 
supra, at pp. 23-25, R.O.A., with Utah Code Ann. Section 10-2-417. 
Sandy City complied with the statutory provisions 
requiring a willingness to annex under the standards and 
requirements of the Code. In addition thereto, the cost 
projections of the development "for any or all [of its] phases," 
exceeded the $750,000 threshold of the statute. Such mandates 
that this Court reverse the lower court's ruling and enter summary 
judgment in favor of Sandy City. 
POINT III 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ACTED ULTRA VIRES, AND, 
ACCORDINGLY, SANDY CITY'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE GRANTED 
A. Salt Lake County Acted in Excess of Its Authority 
Salt Lake County has no authority to act contrary to the 
general laws of the State of Utah. See generally Utah Code Ann. 
Section 17-5-35. Article XI, Sections 4 and 5 of the Utah 
Constitution grant powers to counties and municipalities only as 
the Legislature prescribes. See Utah Const. Art. XI, Sections 4 
and 5. Those sections of the Constitution also clearly establish 
that municipalities are expected to annex property in order to 
"furnish all local public services." Id. at Section 5. 
This constitutional delineation of local authority finds 
expression in the legislative policy declarations of Section 10-2-
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401, which are applicable here. There it states clearly and 
without qualification that municipalities are specifically 
"created to provide urban governmental services essential for 
sound urban development and for the protection of public health, 
safety and welfare in • • . commercial . . . areas and in areas 
undergoing development." Utah Code Ann. Section 10-2-401(2) 
(emphasis added). Thus, the Legislature has given municipalities, 
rather than counties, the governmental prerogatives when it come 
to "areas undergoing development," and the courts are required 
thereby to give due deference to municipalities in such areas. 
Liberally construing Section 10-2-418 in order to 
effectuate the expressed constitutional and legislative intent and 
purpose thereof, it is clear that Salt Lake County had no 
authority from the State Legislature to approve the McDonald's 
development within one-half mile of Sandy City's municipal 
boundaries. With no statutory authorization to approve the 
conditional use application of McDonald's, Salt Lake County acted 
in excess of its authority in approving that application and in 
allowing McDonald's to construct its development in contravention 
of Sandy City's Development Code. Sandy City's prayer for 
extraordinary relief from Salt Lake County's ultra vires action, 
therefore, is simply that which is mandated by law. 
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B. Salt Lake County Violated Its Own Ordinances and Regulations 
Salt Lake County Ordinance 19 •84,090 sets forth 
"conditions for approval" of a conditional use permit by the 
County. Condition "D" thereof states: "That the proposed use 
will conform to the intent of the county master plan." See 
Ordinance 19.84.090, at p. 183, R.O.A. Salt Lake County's error 
here was that it had no county master plan in effect at the time 
McDonald's applied for a conditional use permit and at the time 
Salt Lake County approved that application. Thus, the condition 
set forth in this Salt Lake County ordinance was not satisfied, 
and, contrary to the ordinance, Salt Lake County approved the 
application. 
The county master plan in question was a 10-year plan 
approved and adopted in 1976. By its own terms, it expired in 
1986, before McDonald's applied to Salt Lake County for a 
conditional use permit. Utah law requires that any extension of, 
amendment or addition to a county master plan must be adopted 
formally by the County's Planning Commission, recommended by the 
Planning Commission to the County Commission, and then formally 
adopted by the County Commission. See Utah Code Ann. Sections 17-
27-6 and -6.5. There is no record of Salt Lake County's Planning 
Commission or the Salt Lake County Commission ever extending, 
amending or adding to the master plan here in question pursuant to 
the statutory requirements. 
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In fact, Salt Lake County's failure to have a plan in 
place at all times pertinent here was in direct violation of Utah 
Code Section 17-27-4, which mandates that "each county planning 
commission shall make and adopt a proposed master plan for the 
physical development of the unincorporated territory of the 
county." Id. at Section 17-27-4. Salt Lake County's violation of 
state statute and of its own ordinances here, makes its action 
regarding McDonald's conditional use permit contrary to law and in 
excess of its authority. See Hopkins v. Md. Inmate Grievance 
Comm'n. , 40 Md. App. 729, 391 A.2d 1213 (1978); Kassab v. Acho, 
150 Mich. App. 104, 388 N.W.2d 263 (1986), appeal denied, 393 
N.W.2d 874 (Mich. 1986); Jaramillo v. Fisher Controls Co., Inc., 
102 N.M. 614, 698 P.2d 887 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985). 
C. McDonald's Had No Authority to Develop its Fast-Food 
Restaurant 
Because Salt Lake County acted in excess of its 
authority in approving McDonald's application, the approval has no 
force and effect. McDonald's then, has received no legitimate 
government approval for its development, and, accordingly, the 
development is unlawful. Thus, the lower court's granting of 
summary judgment in favor of McDonald's and Salt Lake County and 
denying Sandy City's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, must be 
reversed. This reversal would allow Sandy City to (a) annex the 
property in question, and/or (b) require McDonald's to obtain 
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Sandy City approval of the development, providing McDonald's with 
the governmental approval it needs for the development. 
POINT IV 
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DOES NOT APPLY HERE AND 
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST SANDY CITY 
BASED THEREON SHOULD BE REVERSED 
What is sometimes referred to as "collateral estoppel" 
is "more accurately described as the issue preclusion branch of 
the doctrine of res judicata." Madsen v. Borthick, 97 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 13, 16 (Dec. 12, 1988). In Swainston v. Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc.. 97 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Dec. 13, 1988), the Utah Supreme 
Court set forth a four-pronged test which must be satisfied before 
a court could bar consideration of issues allegedly determined in 
a prior action. That test is as follows: 
1. Was the issue decided in the prior 
adjudication identical with the one presented in the 
action in question? 
2. Was there a final judgment on the merits? 
3. Was the party against whom the plea is 
asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior 
adjudication? 
4. . . . Was the issue in the first case 
competently, fully, and fairly litigated? 
97 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26. In Swainston,. the Court examined the 
first step of the test to determine whether or not the issue 
allegedly determined in an earlier action was identical to the 
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issue in the case then before the Court. The Court declared: "We 
must determine 'whether the issues actually litigated in the first 
action are precisely the same as those raised in the instant 
action.'" JEd., quoting Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins. Co. 635 P.2d 
417, 419 (Utah 1981). The determination made by the Swainston 
Court was that if "there may be facts" in the first action which 
"were not relevant" to the second action, even if those facts 
create only minor differences, then the court in the second action 
"must make its own assessment of the evidence in the law and rule 
accordingly." Swainston, 97 Utah Adv. Rep. at 26 and 27. 
Thus, if the issues presented in the two cases are not 
"precisely the same," then the court in the second action should 
not bar that second action on the basis of issue preclusion. In 
the case at bar, McDonald's and Salt Lake County argued below that 
certain issues decided by the trial court in the Chevron Action 
were binding on the lower court here and barred any determination 
of issues presented in Sandy City's Verified Complaint. 
Apparently, the lower court agreed with McDonald's and Salt Lake 
County. Contrary to that determination, however, the Madsen and 
Swainston decisions clearly show that where the issues are not 
"precisely the same," issue preclusion does not apply. 
A review of the issues in the instant case, comparing 
the same with those reviewed by Judge Uno in the Chevron Action, 
shows clearly that the issues are not "precisely the same," and 
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that issue preclusion should not have been applied here. The 
Memorandum Decision issued by Judge Uno in the Chevron Action 
specifically referred only to the facts associated with the 
Chevron development, the determination of cost projections for the 
Chevron development, and whether or not specific statutes applied 
to the Chevron development. See Copy of Memorandum Decision at 
pp. 198-201, R.O.A. Here, the issue is whether separate and 
distinct facts associated exclusively with the cost projections 
for the McDonald's development, and facts pertaining exclusively 
to McDonald's application for conditional use, require that 
specific statutory provisions be applied only to the McDonald's 
development. 
The differences between the two cases were clearly 
acknowledged and summarized by the Deputy Salt Lake County 
Attorney during oral argument in the Chevron Action: 
McDonalds isn't a party to this lawsuit. We don't know 
anything about McDonalds. I don't have the foggiest notion 
about what McDonald's plans are, except by a little heresy, 
or how much it is going to cost for them to do it. 
They weren't a part of Chevron's proceeding. They 
weren't a part of it in any way. Chevron made its own 
application to the Planning Commission of Salt Lake 
County. They had nothing to do with McDonalds. 
See Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings Had Feb. 5, 1988, a copy 
attached to McDonald's Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
opposing Sandy City's Motion for Summary Judgment and In Support 
of McDonald's Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, at p. 453, 
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R.O.A. Accordingly, the issues here are different from those 
issues presented in the Chevron Action, and the first element of 
the issue preclusion test set by the Utah Supreme Court is not 
satisfied. According to Swainston, then, the trial court below 
should have made "its own assessment of the evidence in the law 
and rule[d] accordingly," rather than ruling as a matter of law 
that issue preclusion barred Sandy City's Verified Complaint. See 
97 Utah Adv. Rep. at 27. 
POINT V 
THE LOWER COURT ERRONEOUSLY STRUCK AN AFFIDAVIT 
SUBMITTED BY SANDY CITY IN SUPPORT OF 
ITS CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
In its Order denying Sandy City's cross-motion for 
summary judgment and granting the motions for summary judgment 
made by McDonald's and Salt Lake County, the lower court also 
granted McDonald's motion to strike the affidavit and appraisal of 
Gary Free, submitted by Sandy City in support of its cross-motion. 
See Order, supra, at paragraph 5. The lower court held that the 
affidavit and appraisal failed to comply with Rule 56(e) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 703 of the Rules of 
Evidence, but the lower court contradicted its own ruling by 
stating: "However, in ruling on the merits of the pending motions, 
the Court has considered and taken into account Mr. Free's 
affidavit and appraisal." Id. 
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The lower court cannot have it both ways. Either the 
affidavit and appraisal are inadmissible and, therefore, should 
not be taken into account, or, by taking the affidavit and 
appraisal into account, the court overruled its determination that 
the same were inadmissible. By its considering the contents of 
the affidavit and the appraisal, it was completely contradictory 
and inappropriate for the court to grant a motion to strike the 
same. This Court must consider the same matters that the trial 
court considered in reaching its determination. For this Court to 
honor the granting of the motion to strike and not review the same 
matters that the lower court reviewed would be contrary to this 
Court's obligations under the applicable standard of review. See 
generally Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d at 710. 
The lower court also ruled that the expert appraisal 
contained in the affidavit and appraisal of Gary Free were 
"without foundation and . . . based on inadmissible hearsay." See 
Order, supra. It is clear, however, that sworn affidavit 
testimony, which, if given at trial would be admissible, is also 
admissible in affidavit form for purposes of summary judgment. 
See Walker v. Rocky Mtn. Recreation Corp., 508 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah 
1973). The sworn affidavit testimony of Mr. Free, if given at 
trial, would (a) qualify Mr. Free as an expert appraiser, and (b) 
be admitted into evidence for the trier of fact to consider. Rule 
703 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, upon which the lower court 
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relied in granting the motion to strike the affidavit and 
appraisal, states clearly that expert opinion can be based upon 
inadmissible facts or data, if such are of a type reasonably 
relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions 
or inferences upon the subject. See Utah Rules of Evidence 703. 
Thus, even though the data upon which Mr. Free relied in making 
his appraisal were hearsay, if such are the type of data 
reasonably relied upon by experts in the appraisal field, then the 
same can justify and support Mr. Free's expert appraisal. 
Mr. Free's affidavit and appraisal set forth expressly 
that the data he relied upon in reaching his appraisal were data 
reasonably relied upon by other experts in the appraisal field. 
McDonald's never presented any contrary expert opinion or other 
admissible evidence by affidavit to indicate that Mr. Free's 
appraisal and the data upon which it was based did not comport 
with industry standards. Accordingly, Mr. Free's affidavit and 
appraisal satisfied Rule 703 of the Rules of Evidence, and was the 
type of testimony that the lower court would have allowed if the 
testimony had been presented at trial. See generally Wessel v. 
Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d at 253 ("the critical factor in 
determining the competency of an expert is whether that expert has 
knowledge that can assist the trier of fact in resolving the 
issues before it"). According to Utah law, then, the affidavit 
and appraisal should not have been stricken by the lower court. 
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Thus, because the lower court considered the content of 
the affidavit and appraisal in contradiction of the Court's own 
ruling, and because the lower court erroneously struck the 
affidavit and appraisal in contravention of the Rules of Evidence 
and case law decisions controlling the use of affidavits for 
summary judgment purposes, the lower court's granting of 
McDonald's motion to strike the affidavit should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, as a matter of law, 
Sandy City's motion for summary judgment should have been granted 
by the lower court, and the summary judgments against Sandy City 
granted in favor of McDonald's and Salt Lake County should not 
have been granted, and should, therefore, be reversed on appeal. 
Therefore, Sandy City respectfully requests that, there being no 
dispute as to any material fact, and as a matter of law, summary 
judgment in its favor should have been granted below, and that 
this Court reverse the lower court's order and enter summary 
judgment in Sandy City's favor. 
b ~~ day of March, 1990. 
SMITH, REEVE & FULLER 
DATED t h i s 
(4:<8>court®88-0500.apb) 
Christojftier C ^ p y i l e r 
Co-Counsel forlCppel lant 
Sandy City 
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Daniel W. Anderson, A0080 
Jodi Knobel Feuerhelm# A4570 
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FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
A Professional Corporation 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
P. 0. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Telephone: (801) 531-8 900 
Tnird Judicial District 
\ 1989 
CvCj'JI-TY 
b3>:„:./Cl3-k 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SANDY CITY, A Municipal 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, A Political 
Subdivision of the State of 
Utah, SALT LAKE COUNTY PLANNING 
COMMISSION, MCDONALD'S 
CORPORATION, and JOHN DOES 1-5, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO 
DISMISS AND FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
AND MCDONALD'S CORPORATION 
AND MCDONALD'S CORPORATION'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE, AND 
DENYING SANDY CITY'S CROSS 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C88-03898 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
The hearing on McDonald's Corporation's Motion to 
Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment; McDonald's 
Corporation's Amended Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for 
Summary Judgment; Salt Lake County's Motion for Summary Judgment; 
Sandy City's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment; and McDonald's 
Corporation's Motion to Strike Affidavit and Appraisal of Gary 
Free came before this Court on Monday, April 10, 1989 at 10:30 
a.m. Jodi Knobel Feuerhelm and Diane H. Banks appeared on behalf 
of McDonald's Corporation ("McDonald's"); Christopher Fuller and 
Walter Miller appeared on behalf of Sandy City ("Sandy"); and 
Kent Lewis appeared on behalf of Salt Lake County ("County"). 
The Court having reviewed the pleadings, affidavits, documents 
and exhibits filed by all parties on these matters, having heard 
the arguments of counsel, and otherwise being fully advised, 
hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows: 
1. McDonald's Motion to Dismiss is granted on the 
ground that Sandy's action is untimely as a matter of law under 
the doctrine of laches. 
2. Alternatively, McDonald's and the County's motions 
for summary judgment are granted on all of the claims asserted in 
Sandy's Verified Complaint filed herein. 
3. Sandy's claim under Section 10-2-418 of the Utah 
Code ("Section 418") fails as a matter of law based on the 
undisputed facts in the record, in that: 
a. the cost or value of land is not included in 
calculating cost projections under Section 418 of 
the Utah Code; 
b. the cost of furnishings, equipment and 
fixtures is not included in calculating cost 
projections under Section 418 of the Utah Code; 
c. the projected and actual costs of the 
McDonald's restaurant at issue are less than 
$750,000.00; and 
d. Sandy City had not expressed a willingness to 
annex the property that is the subject of this 
-2-
lawsuit at the time that the McDonald's permit 
application was approved. 
4. As an alternative ground for granting McDonald's 
and the County's Motions for Summary Judgment, Sandy is 
collaterally estopped from relitigating the issues relating to 
its Section 418 claim, which were decided adversely to it in the 
litigation involving Chevron in Civil No. C87-07304. 
5. McDonald's Motion to Strike the Affidavit and 
Appraisal of Gary Free is granted as to the portions of Gary 
Free's Affidavit and Appraisal relating to the cost of equipment 
and improvements to the real property. The Court finds that the 
Affidavit and Appraisal fail to comply with Rule 56(e) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 703 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, in that the opinions contained therein are without 
foundation and are based on inadmissible hearsay. However, in 
ruling on the merits of the pending motions, the Court has 
considered and taken into account Mr. Free's Affidavit and 
Appraisal. 
6. There are no disputes of fact with respect to 
Sandy's Title 57 Claim, Agency Claim, and Ordinance Claim (as 
those claims are identified in the Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of McDonald's Motion to Dismiss or in the 
-3-
Alternative for Summary Judgment) and the County and McDonald's 
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on those claims. 
7. Sandy's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment against 
the County and McDonald's is denied. 
8. Sandy's Verified Complaint is hereby dismissed 
with prejudice. 
DATED this of April 1989. 
BY THE COURT 
ck' 
istrict Court 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this / j day of April 1989/ 
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
to be mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Walter R. Miller 
Sandy City Attorney 
440 East 8680 South 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Kent Lewis 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
2001 South State Street, Suite S3600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84900-1200 
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JKF:041189C 
Christopher C. Fuller 
Durbano, Smith, Reeve & Fuller 
4185 Harrison Boulevard, Suite 320 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
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ADDENDUM "B" 
PART 4 
EXTENSION OF CORPORATE LIMITS — LOCAL 
BOUNDARY COMMISSIONS 
10-2-401. Legislative policy. 
The Legislature hereby declares that it is legislative policy that: 
(1) Sound urban development is essential to the continued economic 
development of this state; 
(2) Municipalities are created to provide urban governmental services 
essential for sound urban development and for the protection of public 
health, safety and welfare in residential, commercial and industrial 
areas, and in areas undergoing development; 
(3) Municipal boundaries should be extended, in accordance with spe-
cific standards, to include areas where a high quality of urban govern-
mental services is needed and can be provided for the protection of public 
health, safety and welfare and to avoid the inequities of double taxation 
and the proliferation of special service districts; 
(4) Areas annexed to municipalities in accordance with appropriate 
standards should receive the services provided by the annexing munici-
pality, subject to § 10-2-424, as soon as possible following the annexation; 
(5) Areas annexed to municipalities should include all of the urbanized 
unincorporated areas contiguous to municipalities, securing to residents 
within the areas a voice in the selection of their government; 
(6) Decisions with respect to municipal boundaries and urban develop-
ment need to be made with adequate consideration of the effect of the 
proposed actions on adjacent areas and on the interests of other govern-
ment entities, on the need for and cost of local government services and 
the ability to deliver the services under the proposed actions, and on 
factors related to population growth and density and the geography of the 
area; and 
(7) Problems related to municipal boundaries are of concern to citizens 
in all parts of the state and must therefore be considered a state responsi-
bility. 
History: C. 1953, 10-2-401, enacted by L. Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1979, 
1*79, ch. 25, } 2; L. 1983, ch. 247, * 1. ch. 25, § 2 repealed former § 10-2-401 (L. 
Amendment Notes. — The 19S3 amend- 1977, ch 48, I 2), relating to annexation of 
meat inserted "subject to section 10-2-424" in contiguous territory, and enacted present 
Sub**ction (4). § 10-2-401. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served the foregoing Appellant's 
Brief by mailing four copies to Daniel W. Anderson and Diane H. 
Banks at Fabian & Clendenin, 215 South State Street, Twelfth 
Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84151, attorneys for Respondent 
McDonald's Corp., and four copies to Kent Lewis, Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office, 2001 South State Street, Suite 53600, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84900, attorney for Respondent Salt Lake County, this 
(p*Z- day of March, 1990. 
SMITH, REEVE & FULLER 
by 
Christopher C.yjPulj.er 
Co-Counsel for Appellant 
Sandy City 
(4:®court®88-0500.apb) 
